Hydroelectric Project in Québec: Conflicting Interests

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Teaching Note and Discussion Guide for “Power: One River, Two Nations”

The documentary film “Power” vividly depicts the rocky relationship between the James Bay Cree and Hydro-Québec after 1986, when the state-owned utility announced plans to build a hydroelectric complex on the Great Whale River near established Cree communities. The film offers viewers an extraordinary opportunity to observe and analyze the parties’ actions and interactions. While the most prominent theme is the Cree’s apparently weak bargaining power vis-à-vis Hydro-Québec and the Government of Québec, several other facets of these relationships deserve discussion and lead to lessons about conflict and negotiation.

This teaching note suggests how to use the film as the basis for a case study and class discussion. The five main themes explored in this note are: situational (conflict) analysis, power and influence, internal unity and leadership, relationships between parties with different worldviews, and conflict/negotiation outcomes. The note is intended for use with a short background guide (case) that students should read before viewing the film and a post-film update (1995-2017) for distribution partway through class to stimulate further discussion and enrich the overall value of the session.

The film was produced 20 years ago, but the issues it highlights remain relevant and important today. They are seen in the ongoing relationships between the James Bay Cree and Hydro-Québec, the Government of Québec and the Government of Canada. Similar issues are evident between Indigenous people and state governments around the world, especially with regard to natural resources. The Keystone Pipeline in Canada and the USA, the Dakota Access Pipeline in the USA, and hydroelectric projects on the Mekong River in China, Thailand and Vietnam are just a handful of current day examples. These types of conflicts have often been acrimonious and poorly handled. Further, they are likely to intensify as the world’s population grows and demands more resources. Educators have a role to play in helping future generations of leaders think creatively to find better solutions to these issues.

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This note contains the following sections: 1) target audience, 2) learning objectives, 3) materials, 4) planning the class, 5) pre-class assignment, 6) class discussion, 7) using film excerpts during class, 8) class take-aways, 9) post-class assignment, 10) supplementary resources, and 11) appendices.

The seven appendices are: A) Questions for Discussion, B) Film Excerpts for Playback, C) Individuals and Organizations in “Power” (Film), D) Map of Key Players in the Dispute, E) Interests and Resources of the Primary Parties, F) Key Dates in the James Bay Cree-Hydro-Québec Dispute, 1971-94 and 1995-2017, and G) Dakota Access Pipeline Dispute - A Précis.

Target Audience

The film “Power” and the accompanying study guides are recommended for use with university students and professionals in the fields of business, public affairs, political science, sociology, and

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international relations. The material will serve students interested not only in negotiation and conflict management, but also in topics such as corporate social responsibility, government relations, Indigenous affairs, leadership, and management.

Prior audience exposure to basic concepts and frameworks in conflict analysis and negotiation is useful but not necessary.

Optimal class size is 20-40 students, given the emphasis on class discussion. However, larger groups could be handled effectively with creative techniques (e.g., buzz groups, small group breakouts).

Learning Objectives

Seven teaching/learning objectives for the case are listed below. The case material is rich enough to support all of them (see Appendix A) and more, but individual instructors may prefer to focus on a subset. I would encourage instructors to play to their interests and strengths.

1. How to organize information for an initial understanding of a dispute or negotiation
2. Appreciate the distinctions between parties’ goals, interests, values and rights
3. Expand the conventional view of ways to build and use bargaining power and influence
4. See how the unity of a party is tested by interactions with others and outside events
5. The tasks and responsibilities of a leader in the context of a conflict/negotiation
6. A sense of the challenges involved in relationships between parties with different worldviews and practices (and the challenges in resolving high-stakes disputes)
7. How to evaluate the quality of a negotiation/conflict outcome

Materials

Film Attributes

“Power” (c1996) [a.k.a., in VHS, as “Power: One River, Two Nations”]
Director: Magnus Isacsson
Producer: Glen Salzman et al.
Duration: 76 min 31 sec
Format: DVD

Order Information. Distributor: National Film Board of Canada  www.nfb.ca/boutique
“Power” DVD is ID No. 153C9196089.

Promotion (jacket cover): “When Hydro-Québec announced its intention to proceed with the enormous James Bay II hydroelectric project, the 15,000 Cree who live in the region decided to stand up to the giant utility. With unprecedented access to key figures like Cree leader Matthew Coon Come and American environmental activist Robert Kennedy, Jr., ‘Power’ is the compelling, behind-the-scenes story of the Cree’s five-year battle to save the Great Whale River and their traditional way of life.”

Note on Provenance: The origin of funding for this film has not been made public. The website for a public relations course at First Nations University in Saskatchewan notes that the Cree Nation sponsored the film to raise public awareness about their campaign against Hydro-Québec, but this could not be independently confirmed.

The film covers the dispute primarily from Cree perspectives. It does not offer inside looks at any negotiation sessions between the Cree and Hydro-Québec or the Cree and the Government of Québec,
or any internal meetings on the Québec side. However, it does present statements by various Hydro-Québec and government representatives in interviews and press conferences. On the Cree side, the film shows segments of several internal meetings as well as meetings with allies.

**Study Guides and Film Transcript**

Two “cases”—or more accurately, study guides—have been developed for this film: a pre-film guide (best read before seeing the film) and a post-film update (best read after seeing the film) which describes the subsequent 20 years.

**Case 1: Hydroelectric Project in Québec: Conflicting Interests, 1971-94**  
(Pre-Film Guide for “Power ...”)  
Available as a free download from [www.weissnegotiation.com](http://www.weissnegotiation.com).

**Case 2: Hydroelectric Project in Québec: Aftermath, 1995-2017**  
(Post-Film Update for “Power ...”)  
Available from the author upon request (see below Author Contact Information).

Transcript/Notes for the Film “Power” (key statements and events marked with time locations in the film).  
Available from the author upon request.

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**Planning the Class**

Before delving into detailed class planning, the instructor should consider learning objectives and available class time. If the full set of learning objectives is not feasible or desired, I would suggest at least targeting Objectives 3 (power) and 4 (unity of a party). For assistance in selecting objectives (and corresponding discussion questions and film excerpts), see the inset table below.

Two additional considerations bear mention: 1) how much of the film to show students, and 2) possible assignments before and after class. For maximum educational value, I recommend that students see the entire film (75 minutes), but not during class. It is a long sit that can drain energy, and in-class viewing does not allow students to reflect on the film with some distance or to re-watch scenes. When students view it beforehand, class time can be dedicated entirely to discussion and playback of short excerpts (which introduce “freshness” and excitement that fuel discussion). If students cannot access the film individually, an instructor can arrange to make the film available to them as a group before class.

No matter how much of the film students see, they will benefit from reading the pre-film guide (Case 1). Ideally, they would read it before class (to save time), but it is also short enough for them to read on the spot in 10-15 minutes.

Instructors who want students to delve into this case can also make use of the post-film update and set up a post-class assignment (see below “Post-Class Assignment”).
Equipment and Materials for Class

- A computer/projector (alternatively, a DVD player)
- Two projection screens: one for the player map (Appendix D) or for key dates (Appendix F), one for film excerpts
- A soft file (or DVD) of “Power” annotated for quick playback of excerpts
- Copies of the post-film update (to be distributed one per student)

Pre-Class Assignment

1. Read the Pre-Film Study Guide (4 pp., 15 minutes)
2. Review basic ideas of negotiation analysis (optional)
3. Watch “Power” in its entirety (75 minutes)

For class discussion about the Cree-Hydro-Québec dispute, students should prepare in two ways.

First, before viewing the film, students should read the Pre-Film Study Guide. It provides an historical background and contextual details missing in the film, all of which will enable students to view and process the film more effectively. The guide describes Cree-Canada and Cree-Hydro-Québec relationships and the scope of the James Bay Hydro Project. The guide also gives students a focal point for viewing the film: Can the Cree, Hydro-Québec, and the Government of Québec reach an agreement?

Second, students should watch the entire film before class. As noted above, that will give them time to reflect on what they have seen before analyzing, discussing and evaluating it in depth.

Class Schedule

For a two-hour class (1 hr. 50 min.) for students who have seen the film in advance but not been exposed to conflict analysis or negotiation in previous classes, I have used the following schedule:

1. Introduction to conflict/negotiation analysis 20 minutes
2. Discussion of the dispute and film 50
   a. Situational (conflict) analysis
   b. Power and influence
   c. Unity and leadership
   d. Relationship challenges
3. Aftermath of the dispute/film 25

Learning Objective | Sample Questions (App. A)* | Sample Clips (App. B)*
--- | --- | ---
1. situational analysis | A1-2, A4, B1 | 16, 1, 5
2. interests vs. values, rights | A3, D3 | 1
3. power and influence | B1-4 | 4, 6
4. Cree unity | C1-2 | 9-12
5. leadership | C3 | 13-15
6. different worldviews | A2-3, D1, D3 | 16, 18-19
7. outcome evaluation | E1-3 | 21

* Other questions and clips may also apply, and one clip may serve multiple objectives.
This format was well-received by students in the capstone seminar of a graduate program in public and international affairs. The content of the class is detailed below in “Class Discussion.”

Prior to development of the study guides and my deep-dive into this case, I allocated 30 minutes of a class on negotiation to show two excerpts from “Power.” The equivalent of what are now Clips 16 and 4 and 7 (combined), they were billed as “Voicing a Position, Organizing for Influence” and “Moves Away from the Table - Pressuring the Counterpart.” Together, they ran 9 minutes in length. I have shown these excerpts for years, and they have always captivated students. The bottom line is this: There are many ways to use this case and film to advantage. I am mapping one format below but also providing enough material and ideas (Appendixes A-G) to support other designs that instructors may develop.

Class Discussion (2-hour format): Questions and Answers

This section is based on the two-hour schedule above. The three main parts (introduction, discussion, aftermath) roughly correspond to questions in Appendix A labeled A, B-D, and E. The broad goals for this class are to help students think systematically about this dispute/negotiation, its progress, and efforts to resolve or settle it.

1) Introduction to conflict/negotiation analysis. With students who have not studied conflict or negotiation. I start with questions about their ideas and attitudes toward these concepts. I then offer standard definitions of each term. For negotiation, I favor Walton & McKersie (1965): the deliberate interaction of two or more parties who are attempting to define the terms of their interdependence (or relationship). Next, I present five focal points by which to organize information about any negotiation: the parties, agenda (issues), venue, interaction and outcome. This approach may be briefly illustrated with references to a negotiation already familiar to students (with the graduate students in public affairs, I used the NAFTA renegotiations). The Cree-Hydro-Québec case is best saved for the next section.

To move from information-gathering and organization to interpretation and analysis, I encourage students to focus on the parties’ relationships (connections, interactions) and to look for explanations of their dynamics in the behavior of the parties and influencing conditions. (Here, the instructor could quickly mention common types of behavior (e.g., demands, offers, persuasive appeals, disclosures, threats) and negotiation processes (e.g., positional bargaining, integrative problem-solving). I also remind students of the range of possible negotiation outcomes, from no agreement to comprehensive agreement. The latter essentially result from negotiators’ decisions either to accept available terms or to break off talks. Finally, I put forward two more concepts: negotiators’ (underlying) interests, and resources and capabilities of potential value to counterparts.

All of this enables students to relate their observations to key concepts in negotiation analysis and lays a foundation for discussion.

2) Discussion of the dispute/film. At this point, I turn to the Cree-Hydro-Québec dispute over James Bay II and project a map of the James Bay Cree Territory (Figure 2 in the pre-film guide). After asking students to identify the primary parties (the Cree, Hydro-Québec, the Government of Québec), I project the Player Map (Appendix D, top half) on the classroom screen and divide the class into four sections,
tasking each section with representing one primary party or the outsiders (the media and interest groups) for the following discussion topics.

a) **Situational analysis** (see Appendix A, Questions A1-4). Having identified the parties and seen the film, students point to the subject of the conflict as James Bay Phase II—specifically, construction of a hydroelectric station on the Great Whale River. (The proposed station would be located over 250 km from the Cree community Whapmagoostui (called “Great Whale” in the film) at the mouth of the Great Whale, but it would entail flooding 1,774 km² of land and reducing the river flow by 85%). Then I ask each of the three main student groups to state their positions. (The outsider group comes into play later.) Hydro-Québec and the Government of Québec want to proceed with the project; the Cree oppose it. As Robbie Dick, Chief of Great Whale states early in the film, “We don’t want this” (1m28s). (Yet the situation seems a little more complicated than this, as noted below.)

Then students should consider parties’ underlying interests (Question A2). For example, the Cree are concerned about preserving their way of life and culture, and Hydro would like to minimize the cost of Phase II and ultimately, maximize revenue and income. (For more answers, see Appendix E.)

<table>
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<th>James Bay Cree Communities (n=9): Features</th>
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<tr>
<td>Largest: Mistissini, Chisasibi (&gt; 3,000 residents each)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Smallest: Nemaska (seat of The Grand Council)</td>
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Most affected by JB Hydro Project (by location):  
Near LaGrande River: Chisasibi  
Near Great Whale River: Whapmagoostui  
Near Rupert River: Waskaganish, Nemaska  
Near Eastmain River: Eastmain

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**Side Note:** Interests are central to negotiation analysis, but this conflict also involves values and rights. Negotiation analysts view interests as the motivators for negotiator behavior and as the appropriate basis for sound (i.e., rational) decision-making. They also underscore a pragmatic rationale: Interests (cf. positions) can usually be satisfied in more than one way. But do these perspectives hold for values and rights? In *Managing Across Cultures*, Schneider and Barsoux (2002:30) define values as “preferred states about the way things should be, about ideals.” In contrast, interestingly, Merriam Webster’s first definition of the word is “monetary worth of something.” What are the values of the Cree? How do they differ or resemble (parallel) those of the Québécois? Cree spokesmen in “Power” speak of honoring the land and spiritual attachment whereas Premier Bourassa asserts that he will “conquer the north” (see “Power” at 4m00s). Are such values reconcilable or negotiable? Consider the historical solution to these disputes: “land for money” (Reid at 48m50s). (For rights, see “Power and Influence” below).

At this point, I ask students to share their impressions of the parties’ real goals. While they are neither explicitly stated in the film nor definitively discernible, and addressing them calls for assumptions and inferences, they are an important consideration in trying to make sense of the situation. Hydro-Québec obviously wants to minimize—even eliminate—Cree opposition to their project. The film does not clarify whether or not Hydro seeks, for legal or practical reasons, the Cree’s formal consent to proceed with the project. The Cree evidently want to halt the project (Coon Come says, “I have a mandate to stop the project” (4m30s)). One film segment (see Kennedy at 28m37s) suggests that the Cree only want an environmental impact study, but it seems likely that Kennedy was downplaying real Cree goals in his meeting with Massachusetts politicians in order to get them onboard. Other Cree goals voiced in the film are: to be respected, democratically, by the provincial government (“we are the majority” of residents of James Bay); to have a “say” in economic projects in the province; and to “bring back the pride, unity and strength of a nation” (Reid at 1h11m15s).
b) Power and influence. Having laid the groundwork above, I then ask the Cree student group, “Are you concerned about your ability to achieve your goal?” This spearheads a discussion of bargaining power and influence.

It is important to set forth a working definition of “power” since it carries negative connotations for many students. In a negotiation context, it simply refers to the “capabilities negotiators can assemble to give themselves an advantage or to increase the probability of achieving their objectives” (Lewicki et al., 2010). Shell (1999) has written: “leverage” is “the power to reach an agreement on one’s own terms.”

In this light, students should consider Cree resources and capabilities in this dispute. What do they possess that is of value to Hydro-Québec and the Government of Québec? Is their primary capability not resisting James Bay II and specifically, the Great Whale Project? (For more possibilities, see Appendix E.) Much of the general literature on negotiation suggests that a negotiator’s power derives from their BATNA (best alternative to reaching a negotiated agreement with the counterpart at hand). Here, the Crees’ BATNA is no deal (cancellation of the project), but cancellation is only a BATNA for the Cree if Hydro-Québec needs their consent to proceed with the project. If not, cancellation is not an alternative that the Cree can unilaterally exercise; it cannot be their BATNA. The film does not describe consent, legal or other rights of the Cree granted in the James Bay–Northern Québec Agreement, so handling this topic well in class will require pre-class research by the instructor. One other point to make here is that a view of power that focuses solely on BATNAs seems myopic, particularly in this case.

At this point in the discussion, I ask students what they noticed the Cree doing in the film to increase their power. For examples of answers, see the box below. To stimulate discussion, an instructor can play various film excerpts (see “Using Film Excerpts” below and Appendix B). One might also project...
for students the Player Map, II in Appendix D (note the expanded number of actors) and the timeline of key actions and events up to 1990 in Appendix F.

| Learning Objective 3. Expand Conventional Ways to Build Power and Influence |
| Question B3 (Steps by the Cree) |
| **Answers:** |
| conventional – consult outside advisors (lawyers, subject experts), conduct strategy sessions, inform constituents (communities), speak with one voice (Chief Coon Come), “go public” and/or hold press conferences (local mass media), use legal tactics (e.g., lawsuits), give voice to aggrieved individuals at a town meeting/information session with Hydro-Québec, meet with Hydro-Québec executives in Montreal |
| unconventional - identify and exploit pressure points on the counterpart (big customers, big contracts), seek allies with deep pockets (e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, international NGOs) and supporters with political clout (e.g., New York politicians), expand public awareness beyond Québec (USA, New York Times ad), solicit allies and educate them about Cree worldview/culture (e.g., take Kennedy “out on the river”) |
| (Note: The James Bay Cree have official status with the United Nations as an NGO.) |

A different take on this topic is to ask students what the parties did well, or poorly, in the dispute/negotiation. For the former, past students have cited Cree use of mass media, and for the latter, Hydro-Québec’s “dismal” public relations. With respect to Hydro-Québec’s use of power, the company implemented several tactics: denying the legitimacy of Cree concerns, waiting out the Cree, approaching Cree communities individually rather than collectively through the Grand Council (“divide and conquer”), making a take-it-or-leave-it offer for additional flooding related to James Bay I, holding press conferences, relying on the province’s political and legal systems (e.g., compensation for injury, signatures on legal agreements/contracts), and more. Note also that various Cree in the film rejected the Cree’s previous negotiation conduct with Hydro-Québec as an acceptable approach to this dispute on the grounds that it entailed too much compromise. They also claimed that Hydro-Québec abused the terms of agreements.

c) **Cree unity and leadership.** To exercise fully whatever power they had (and for intrinsic reasons as a people), the Cree needed to present a united front before Hydro-Québec and the Government of Québec. Cree leaders realized the importance of unity as far back as the mid-1970s during James Bay I and formed the Grand Council of the Crees to represent the interests of all nine Cree communities. (Recall that decision-making among the Cree was still based on consensus; major decisions by the Council required consent through community referenda.) The Council generally served the communities well, but the film shows how the James Bay II (Great Whale) dispute tested Cree unity and commitment.

I would suggest starting this discussion by asking students to identify scenes in the film that revealed tension and divisions among the Cree. Which relationships were involved? (See the box below.) Then the class can take up causes of the divisions and Coon Come’s responses (see Appendix A, Questions C1-3; Appendix B, Clips 9-12 and 13-15). Two visual aids will facilitate this discussion: the map of Cree communities in James Bay (Pre-Film Guide, Figure 2) and key players in the dispute (Appendix D).
Various pressures acted on the Cree. The protracted nature of the Great Whale dispute, which lasted 8 years (1986-94)—and for that matter, the entire set of James Bay projects (dating from 1971)—was bound to wear down leaders and constituents at varying rates. Moreover, the communities had different needs and interests, and their importance shifted over time and pushed up against common interests. New actions and events over this period further tested unity because the chiefs and their constituents quite naturally did not always interpret or react to them eye-to-eye. Personal ambitions of various individuals among the Cree and their allies caused additional tension and division. Finally, Hydro-Québec and the Government of Québec were not beyond “divide and conquer” tactics. They deliberately approached Cree communities individually in 1993, as revealed in the film (Clip 9: $50 million for additional flooding related to JB-II), and after the film, in 1995-2000 (see the Post-Film Update).

Grand Chief Coon Come had to face these internal tensions and divisions. He adopted various responses and leadership styles, which ranged from reassurance and patient listening of community input to a final decision contrary to at least one task force member’s stance. As Coon Come puts it in Clip 13 (48m08s), “There is a time to fight, a time to negotiate, and a time to decide.” At another point (Clip 10), while meeting with English-speaking lawyers and advisors, he switches to Cree to converse with Task Force Coordinator Mukash. Another noteworthy scene comes at the end of the film when Coon Come attends a traditional, Cree event on the river in order to “heal divisions” (1h04m10s).

The general effectiveness of Coon Come’s leadership seems clear from his accomplishments in the film and subsequent Cree support for him. James Bay II (Great Whale) was suspended and eventually, abandoned, as the Cree wished. Coon Come continued as Grand Chief of the Cree until 1999. He was then elected National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations (2000-2003). The Cree re-elected him Grand Chief of the Crees in 2009, and he stayed in that role until his retirement from public life in 2017.

d) Relationship challenges. The discussion about intra-party tension should lead well into discussion about relationships more generally in a dispute or negotiation context. While a dispute or negotiation can occur between parties of any kind, this film demonstrates how disparate parties’ positions can be. The extreme difference between Cree and Québécois worldviews and practices is, in my view, second only to power as a key theme of the film. There is no better illustration than Clip 16, the town meeting in the opening moments of the film (see below “Film Excerpts,” and Appendix B). Although this meeting takes place between mid-level Hydro-Québec representatives and community residents, not the leaders of either side, it dramatically shows how far apart the Cree and Québécois are even on such basic matters as respect, communication and understanding. How, then, can they resolve a dispute or reach an agreement?

One of the educational benefits of a documentary film of any dispute or negotiation is the abundance of behavioral data and opportunity to observe both sides of interactions (action and reaction sequences). This film is no different. I encourage students to observe film segments carefully: to listen to

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**Learning Objective 4. Cree Unity**

**Question C1 (Types of tensions and division)**

**Answers:**
- within the Cree negotiation team/task force: between Cree members (Coon Come vs. Mukash), between Cree and non-Cree members (chiefs vs. lawyers, advisers)
- between the Grand Council and community residents/grass roots (e.g., Diane Reid)
- among Cree communities (e.g., Chisasibi and Waskaganish vs. Great Whale)
speakers’ statements, watch their nonverbal language, and try to assess their impact on counterparts. Some differences in worldview mentioned above are reflected in communications and interactions in the film (for related clips, see Appendix B). Only a few scenes in the film show both Cree and non-Cree interlocutors, but there are enough for discussion. The instructor could even use some of the Cree-Cree conversations to illustrate such micro-analysis (intended meaning vs. received meaning/interpretation, what is said vs. what is not said, what is said vs. what is expressed nonverbally). All of this can be steered toward a general discussion of “do’s and don’ts” for ameliorating relationships between disputants.

3. Aftermath of the dispute/film. As the film ultimately shows, the Cree and Hydro-Québec did not reach an agreement. Hydro-Québec (Government of Québec) unilaterally suspended the Great Whale Project in 1994 (see Clip 20). Related questions for discussion are listed in Appendix A (Questions E1-3).

What caused the suspension? Given the main theme of the film, one might quickly answer: “the overwhelming pressure put on Hydro-Québec and the Government of Québec to make that decision—pressure caused by the Cree’s various moves to increase their bargaining power (recall the list in “Power and Influence” above). Hydro lost a C$17 billion contract with New York State. Surely the company wanted to limit the stain on its reputation and preserve the possibility of bringing back such a huge customer in the future. In short, Cree-induced, outside pressure is arguably the most influential determinant of the outcome.

Yet there are additional possibilities to consider. Premier Parizeau’s public reason was that the project was no longer needed. He was apparently referring to American need for energy, but some pundits also speculated that the failed referendum for an independent Québec meant that the province had less need for the revenue from the project. Others have cited the excess capacity that Hydro had even without Great Whale. Furthermore, when it was released, the environmental impact study of the Great Whale Project elicited major criticism from federal and provincial bodies, though that, again, amounted to outside pressure. Absent a record or disclosure of the executive session in which Hydro (or the Government of Québec) made the decision, we cannot sort through these factors with certainty, but they deserve attention, especially given the actions and events that followed (see below).

After the class grapples with explaining the outcome, I ask them to evaluate it. An instructor can start with a general question (“Was this a good outcome?”) and record the answers, but then I would suggest asking students to specify for whom and on what grounds. (For examples, see the box below.) Students can make use of the parties’ interests and goals that they identified earlier in the discussion (see also Appendix E). This is the standard approach to outcome evaluation in negotiation literature.

### Learning Objective 7. Outcome Evaluation

**Question E2 (Good outcome in 1994?)**

**Answers:**

*for Cree:* yes, achieved their goal (postponement, then cancellation) and satisfied many interests (preservation of their way of life in that area)

*for H-Q:* no, failed to achieve goal (defeat opposition, get go-ahead for the project), did not meet interests (growth, revenue), and suffered damage to reputation

*for Government of Québec:* no, failed to deliver on public promise to build biggest hydro site in N. America, did not meet interests (revenue), and received criticism within Canada and in USA (public relations/image)—though Parizeau put a brave face on it (a “setback,” not a failure)
I would urge an instructor to take the students a step further, however, and have them assess the outcome from a longer time horizon. Here, the instructor can project the 1995-2017 timeline of key events (Appendix F) on a classroom wall, walk through it quickly, and hand out the “Post-film Update” for students to peruse on the spot (5 mins.). Then they can reconsider the 1994 outcome from the vantagepoint of what happened over the next 20 years.

As it turns out, the suspension of the Great Whale Project became permanent; it was never reactivated. On other hand, Hydro-Québec built three more generating stations, thereby completing the rest of James Bay Phase II. How much of that subsequent work was the price the Cree paid for “winning” the cancellation of Great Whale? Was blocking Great Whale only a one-time event that did not prevent powerful Hydro-Québec from marching onward with more projects? It took ten years, until 2004, for the Cree to reach a major agreement with Hydro-Québec and to drop their remaining lawsuits against the company. Would the Cree have preferred to see no more stations (i.e., all of JB-II abandoned)? While these questions may not be fully answerable by the students, they are worth contemplating.

If Cree relationships with Hydro-Québec, the Government of Québec, and the Government of Canada are still not entirely what the Cree would like them to be today (per the Post-Film Update), the period since the Great Whale dispute has nevertheless seen some major undertakings to improve these relationships. The Cree Nation concluded new, wide-ranging “relationship agreements” with the Government of Québec in 2002 (Paix des Braves) and the Government of Canada in 2017 as well as with Hydro-Québec in 2004. In addition, from 2002-06, the Cree negotiated at least ten agreements with Hydro on issues such as training, remedial work (for land), mercury pollution, mineral resource development, disassembly of stations, and dispute resolution. (See Cree Nation documents below in “Supplementary Resources.”) They suggest a deepening of the relationship and willingness to address specific concerns.

Side Note. Was “icing” the project a negotiation outcome? If we assume that negotiations did occur over Great Whale (i.e., that the two sides did not simply fight it out), then the answer is “yes.” No-agreement is an outcome of negotiation that can be brought about unilaterally (either side can break off talks) or jointly (agree to disagree). At the same time, the outcome in this case clearly was not mutually satisfactory—the ostensible purpose of any good-faith negotiation.

Finally, to bring this discussion to a close from a negotiation perspective, one could ask, “Could the Great Whale dispute (1989-94) have ended better—for all parties?” Could they have reached a mutually satisfactory outcome? In Getting to Yes, Fisher and Ury state that a “wise” agreement meets the legitimate interests of each side, resolves conflicts fairly and efficiently, and includes terms that are durable, improve the relationship, and take the broader community into account. Was that possible here?

4. Q&A. Before bringing the class to a close with take-aways, the instructor should set aside some time for questions. Consider, for instance, the following:

- Did the Cree and Hydro-Québec ever negotiate over Great Whale? Did this film portray a negotiation? Some segments show Cree and Hydro-Québec representatives outside or in a meeting room (e.g., at the latter’s offices in Montreal at 48m08s), so it is evident that they had discussions. Because the discussions were not filmed, however, we do not learn what they discussed. (One negotiation that definitely did take place was over compensation for additional flooding associated with James Bay I.)
• Did the parties ever consider possible technical solutions to the projected negative consequences of the James Bay projects? At this advanced stage of the technological age, why do hydroelectric plants still require so much water and flooded land to generate electrical power?
• How can a negotiator deal effectively with intangibles for oneself or for a counterpart (e.g., pursuing one’s way of life/culture, honoring traditions and sacred land, preserving the environment for future generations)? Can the meaning or worth of such concerns be quantified or expressed with objective criteria or terms? Further, what about dealing with very long-term consequences (generations)?

5. Wrap-Up: Lessons. It is always important (and often interesting) to ask students for lessons from the discussion. For this two-hour class format, students have mentioned: how to “bring down” higher power creatively, the importance of a relationship focus in conflict and negotiation analysis, and the insights possible from paying attention to counterparts’ reactions. For lessons tied to each of the learning objectives at the outset of this teaching note, see the section below titled “Class Take-Aways.”

Using Film Excerpts during Class Discussion

Appendix B lists 21 short clips (18 last less than 3.0 minutes) related to the learning objectives in this note and discussion questions in Appendix A. Here are brief notes on cues and themes illustrated by six clips. They relate to three learning objectives: power and influence, Cree unity, and Cree-Hydro relationship challenges (different worldviews).

Power and Influence
Clip 4 (4m30s): Odyak arrives in NY, statements by Hydro-Québec, Coon Come, American politicians
Notice: public image projected by the Cree (and attention received), positions and complaints made by Mukash and Coon Come, impact of Cree actions on Americans (“exquisite,” Hydro “look like dunces”)

Clip 5 (40s): Québec Minister of Energy, Bacon, makes rambling but revealing statement to the press
Notice: contradictions (still “Québeckers” but “they”), positional bargaining (“territory is ours,” “haven’t given it up”), blame, impact of Cree maneuvers (“penalizing us,” “discrediting Québec all over the world”)

Cree Unity
Clip 10 (4m05s): Telephone conversation between Coon Come in Montreal and Mukash in Great Whale concerning $50 million offer from Hydro-Québec to flood more land for James Bay I; Mukash informs Coon Come of a “heated” conflict among the bands and criticism of Cree leaders
Notice: Mukash’s general expression of “problem,” Mukash’s position (delay the signature), Mukash switches from English to Cree after O’Reilly interjects, Coon Come’s response in Cree and explanation of his decision, Coon Come’s request for Mukash’s assent (“all right?”), Mukash hangs up without replying

Clip 11 (1m37s): Cree task force meets in Montreal with lawyers (e.g., O’Reilly), conflict between some Cree leaders (Mukash, Mianscum) and O’Reilly
Notice: blaming outside lawyer (“been manipulated”), O’Reilly’s push back (“what you are really criticizing”), wear-and-tear on Cree Nation (Reid says fighting among selves to take charge)
Relationship Challenges: Different Worldviews and Practices (Communication)

Clip 16 (3m30s): Town meeting in Great Whale between Cree and Hydro-Québec representatives

Notice: different communication styles (Hydro representative cf. Cree elders, statistics vs. images), negative nonverbal language of Hydro representatives (reactions to Cree drums, speeches), apparent lack of meaningful dialogue, “rights” vs. “pieces of paper”

Clip 1 (1m17s): Deputy Chief Niquanaccappo of Great Whale appeals to and educates Bobby Kennedy about the place of “the land” in Cree culture and life

Notice: setting (outdoors, traditional tipi) chosen to deliver message, emphasis on values, source of values (land), history/legacy (5,000 years)

Beyond the clips above and others enumerated in Appendix B, instructors can locate additional excerpts for playback, analysis and discussion in the film transcript prepared with this teaching note.

Class Take-Aways

- **Understanding a dispute or negotiation.** Gather information about five key topics: the parties, expressed agenda, venue, interaction, and outcome.
- **Interests vs. values.** Common negotiation wisdom suggests a focus on interests, but some situations, like this one, call also for consideration of values.
- **Power and influence.** Influencing a counterpart—an essential element of negotiation—requires power. A party lacking it can acquire it in unconventional ways, as the Cree did.* [*In an interesting parallel to the Crees’ entreaties to American politicians in the 1990s, in 2018, Prime Minister Trudeau met with American CEOs ostensibly in the hope they would influence the U.S. government while the countries were renegotiating NAFTA.]*
- **Cree unity.** External negotiations strain internal relationships, and a united front must be maintained to exercise power to maximum effect. The Cree worked hard to stay together.
- **Leadership.** A party’s chosen leader faces a variety of internal and external responsibilities in a negotiation. Coon Come handled them well.
- **Relationship challenges (worldviews).** When parties’ worldviews are vastly different and core values conflict, communication can be problematic and bridges hard to build.
- **Outcome evaluation.** The true quality of a negotiation outcome is best appreciated not right away, but after the parties have lived with it for some time.

Post-Class Assignments

For students interested in extending their understanding of this dispute and its implications, an instructor could assign a post-class paper. Among the possible “stretch” topics, consider:

1) **Resolving High-Stakes Conflict: Beyond Pressure Tactics.** What are the pros and cons of relying on coercive power to settle disputes? How can parties find or create promising, unconventional approaches to resolution?

2) **The James Bay Cree and Hydro-Québec: Looking Ahead to the Relationship in 2030.** This assignment would involve adopting a Cree perspective and identifying lingering issues in the current relationship and other issues likely to arise over the next ten years.
3) The Great Whale and Dakota Access Pipeline Plans: Lessons for Business Executives. What was similar, and what was different, about opposition to these projects? What general lessons can be drawn for executives and managers of major energy companies?

Supplementary Resources

For a large collection of material from Canadian media sources related to this case, see:

Cree Nation documents:
New Funding Since the New Relationship Agreement with Quebec, brochure (c2005/6)

American coverage of this case in The New York Times can be found in:

Canada’s constitutional negotiations in 1983-85 between First Nations and the Canadian Government (first ministers) were documented in two films available from the National Film Board of Canada.
https://www.nfb.ca/search/#?queryString=Dancing%20Around%20the&index=0&language=en

Dancing Around the Table, Part I (c1987) 57 minutes
Dancing Around the Table, Part II (c1987) 50 minutes

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Appendix A. Questions for Discussion

A. Situational Analysis (Initial)
1. Who are the primary parties, and what is the subject of this dispute/conflict?
2. What are the parties’ positions? What are the underlying interests?
3. To understand this conflict well, how important is it to consider not only parties’ goals, but also their values and rights?
4. How would you characterize the relationship between the James Bay Cree and Hydro-Québec in 1989?

B. Bargaining Power and Influence
1. At the outset of this dispute (1986), what resources and capabilities do the Cree have to pursue their goals and influence Hydro-Québec?
2. Initially, why do the Cree consider their bargaining power weaker than Hydro-Québec’s?
3. What steps do the Cree take to build and exercise their power? Which steps are most effective?
4. Could Hydro-Québec have addressed this dispute and influenced the Cree more effectively through other means—or through better execution of the means they chose?

C. Cree Unity and Leadership
1. As the dispute progresses, what types of tension and division appear among the Cree?
2. How do these tensions affect Cree interactions with Hydro-Québec? How do the tensions affect Cree relationships with their advisors and other allies?
3. What do you think of Grand Chief Coon Come’s leadership during this period (e.g., his responses to internal tensions, his representation of Cree concerns to outsiders)?

D. Cree-Hydro Relationship Challenges: Different Worldviews, Practices
1. What do you notice about the parties’ communication styles and interactions? (Consider conversations among the Cree, and the Cree and their allies, as well as public and other statements by Cree, Hydro-Québec and Government representatives.)
2. How much do parties’ negative perceptions and assertions about counterparts’ intentions exacerbate the conflict and complicate attempts to negotiate a resolution?
3. How can a negotiator understand and best work with a counterpart whose worldview differs markedly from his/her own?

E. Outcome Evaluation
1. What caused Premier Parizeau to put the Great Whale Project “on ice”?
2. In 1994, was that a good outcome? On what grounds, for whom?
3. In the long term (as of 2018), was the 1994 outcome a good one?
4. What lessons does this experience suggest for other Indigenous-state government conflicts, especially those centered on use of natural resources?
Appendix B. Film Excerpts for Playback: Summary of Possibilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clip</th>
<th>Location (min.sec)*</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Contents</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Learning</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>Question**</td>
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<td><strong>Interests vs. Values</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>20.43-22.00</td>
<td>A3, D3</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>59.00-59.24</td>
<td>A1-3</td>
<td>24s</td>
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<td><strong>Bargaining Power &amp; Influence</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>10.00-11.00</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>1m00s</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>13.50-18.20</td>
<td>B3, D2</td>
<td>4m30s</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>18.21-19.02</td>
<td>D1, C3</td>
<td>40s</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>24.55-26.22</td>
<td>A4, B1-2</td>
<td>1m27s</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>31.18-32.48</td>
<td>D1</td>
<td>30s</td>
</tr>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>43.51-46.24</td>
<td>B3, D1-2</td>
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<td><strong>Cree Unity</strong></td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>45.05-48.07</td>
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<td>3m02s</td>
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<td>49.30-53.35</td>
<td>C1-3</td>
<td>4m05s</td>
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<td>11.</td>
<td>59.54-1.01.31</td>
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<td>1m37s</td>
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<td>12.</td>
<td>1.01.43-1.07.09</td>
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<td>13.</td>
<td>48.08-48.49</td>
<td>C3</td>
<td>40s</td>
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<td>14.</td>
<td>51.37-53.35</td>
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<td>1m58s</td>
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<td>15.</td>
<td>1.04.10-1.07.09</td>
<td>C3</td>
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<td><strong>Relationship Challenges: Worldviews, Practices</strong></td>
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<td>5.00-8.30</td>
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<td>3m30s</td>
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<td>17.</td>
<td>27.30-27.49</td>
<td>B4, D2</td>
<td>19 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>34.26-35.31</td>
<td>B2, D1</td>
<td>1m05s</td>
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<td>38.05-38.45</td>
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<td>21.</td>
<td>1.13.28-1.14.20</td>
<td>E2</td>
<td>52s</td>
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</table>

Key: GoQ = Government of Québec, H-Q = Hydro-Québec
* Based on DVD format of the film
** See Appendix A for questions.
Appendix C. Individuals and Organizations in “Power” (Film)

**Hydro-Québec**
- Richard Douin, Chairman
- Armand Couture, CEO
- Stella Leney (project team/delegation to Great Whale)
- Jacques Guévrémont, Hydro-Québec’s representative in the USA
- Richard Le Hir, Québec Manufacturers’ Association

**Province of Québec**
- Premier Robert Bourassa
- Lise Bacon, Minister of Energy
- Jacques Parizeau, Leader, Parti Québécois

**Cree Nation Government/Grand Council of the Crees**
- Matthew Coon Come, Grand Chief
- Matthew Mukash, Task Force Coordinator (and later Chief, Great Whale)

**Cree Communities**
- Chisasibi, Eastmain, Mistissini, Nemaska, Ouje-Bourgoumou, Waskaganish, Waswanipi, Wemindji, Whapmagoostui (featured in the film but called “Great Whale”)

**USA**
- Natural Resources Defense Council
  - Robert Kennedy Jr.

**State of Massachusetts**
- State Legislature
  - William Bulger, President of the Senate

**State of New York**
- Mario Cuomo, Governor
- New York Power Authority

**State Legislature**
- Bill Hoyt, State Assemblyman
Appendix D. Map of Key Players in the Dispute: Initial Phase (I), Public Phase (II)

Hydro Quebec-JB Cree Dispute, I
James Bay II Project, 1989-94

Government of Quebec
Premier Bourassa/Parizeau

Hydro Québec
Board of Directors
B. Douin, Chmn

CEO
A. Couture

Crees of Eeyou Istchee*
Grand Council
Executive Committee

Grand Chief
M. Com.Com

* Cree Communities:
- Whapmagoostui (Great Whale) - Chief Robbie Dick
- Niguaxe'eg (Mistissini) - Chief Henry Manscum
- Chisasibi
- Eastmain
- Nipisihk
- Neskantaga
- Waswanipi
- Wemindji

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Hydro Quebec-JB Cree Dispute, II
James Bay II Project, 1989-94

Government of Quebec
Premier Bourassa/Parizeau

Hydro Quebec
Board of Directors
B. Douin, Chmn

CEO
A. Couture

mass media
in Canada

mass media
in USA

Interest Groups/NGOs
NRDC (Kennedy)

Crees of Eeyou Istchee*
Grand Council
Executive Committee

Grand Chief
M. Com.Com

mass media
(Quebec)

Task Force
W. Makaski

H-Q Customers
New York State
Legislature (Gov. Cuomo)

NY Power Authority

New York State
Legislature (Gov. Cuomo)

* Cree Communities:
- Whapmagoostui (Great Whale) - Chief Robbie Dick
- Niguaxe'eg (Mistissini) - Chief Henry Manscum
- Chisasibi
- Eastmain
- Nipisihk
- Neskantaga
- Waswanipi
- Wemindji

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Appendix E. Interests and Resources of the Primary Parties

Interests of the Parties

James Bay Cree
- prevent irreparable damage to their land (territory) and communities
- preserve their way of life (culture)
- gain standing, respect from Hydro-Quebec and governments (Quebec, Canada)
- improve their historical relationship with H-Q and GoQ
- honor sacred grounds
- restitution for historical grievances?

Hydro-Quebec
- defeat Cree resistance to JB project
- obtain Cree consent?
- minimize cost of JB project
- increase revenue and income
- provide low-cost power to Quebecois
- maintain support from Gov’t of Quebec
- retain, increase customer base
- favorable public reputation

Government of Quebec
- placate the JB Cree
- maintain, gain public support
- create jobs
- support state-owned company (H-Q)
- produce environmentally responsible and low cost power
- revenue for budget

Cree & Hydro-Quebec Interests-Resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Interests</th>
<th>Resources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coon Come</td>
<td>serve the Cree people maintain support</td>
<td>leadership abilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couture</td>
<td>reputation</td>
<td>backing of the Cree GC, communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>legacy (scale of project)</td>
<td>access to H-Q’s resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>decision-making power re: project?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Cree GC (nation) | preserve culture gain standing | established presence (communities)              |
| Hydro Q          | provide low-cost power max revenue and income | legal rights to land?                           |
| ...              | ...                             | experience, knowledge of the river systems, wildlife and lands |
| Gov’t of Q       | maintain public support create jobs | technical and management expertise experience with previous hydro projects |

...
Appendix F. Key Dates in James Bay Cree-Hydro-Québec Dispute, 1971-94 and 1995-2017

1971-94 (before and during the film “Power”)
1971 Apr Premier Bourassa (1970-76) announces multi-billion dollar James Bay Hydro Project
1975 Nov James Bay-Northern Québec Agreement signed

1984 May La Grande Complex (3 power stations) in James Bay (Phase I) completed
1986 Dec Premier Bourassa (1985-94) announces James Bay Phase II in Québec Parliament
1987 Apr Coon Come (Chief of Mistissini) elected Grand Chief of the Crees of Eeyou Istchee
1989 Apr Premier Bourassa and New York Governor Mario Cuomo sign US$13 bn (C$17) contract for Hydro-Québec to supply power to New York State
   ___ James Bay Phase II construction begins on LG-1 at the mouth of La Grande Rivière

1990 Mar 24 Cree and Inuit delegation begin 6-week trek (Voyage of the Odyak) from Ottawa to New York City via Lake Champlain and Albany to make grievances known in the USA; they hold public demonstrations en route
   Apr 20 delegation arrives in New York City on Earth Day
1990 June Meech Lake Accord fails to be fully ratified
1992 Mar New York State cancels contract with H-Q
1993 Jan 8 Grand Council, Chisasibi, and Wemindji sign agreement with Hydro-Québec, after two years of negotiation, for $50 mn more compensation for James Bay I and drop lawsuits
1994 Sept in provincial elections, Parti Québécois wins, and Parizeau becomes premier
   Nov 21 Premier Parizeau shelves Great Whale Project
1995 Oct Referendum on Québec Sovereignty (defeated)

1995-2017 (after the film)
1999       Ted Moses, Chief and Mayor of Eastmain (1987-1990), elected Grand Chief of the Crees of Eeyou Istchee (also previously served from 1984-87)
2000 July  Coon Come elected National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations
2002 Feb   “Paix des Braves” signed; Cree agree to Rupert River Project with conditions
2002ff     Multiple negotiations and agreements between the Cree and Hydro-Québec (e.g., Apatissiwin, Nadoshtin, Boumhounan, Mineral Resources, Mercury, Demantelement)
2003-13    construction of Eastmain/Sarcelle/Rupert Project
2004       Cree-Hydro-Québec Agreement on New Relationship signed; Cree Nation drops lawsuits
2009       Coon Come re-elected Grand Chief of the Grand Council of the Crees
2012 July 24 Cree-Québec Agreement on Governance of Eeyou Istchee James Bay Territory signed
2017 July 18 Cree-Canada Agreement on Cree Nation Governance signed
2017 July   Coon Come completes term as Grand Chief and retires from public life
Appendix G. Dakota Access Pipeline Dispute (2014-17): A Précis

The Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) is a 1,172-mile-long underground oil pipeline in the USA that runs from North Dakota’s Bakken shale oil fields to an oil tank farm near Patoka, Illinois. Energy Transfer Partners (the parent of Sunoco) and its partners (Phillips 66, Enbridge, Marathon Petroleum) announced plans to build it in June 2014. The proposal sparked protests from the nearby Standing Rock Sioux Reservation (see gold area in Figure 1). Additional parties, including multiple levels and agencies of government, were quickly drawn into the conflict.

Supporters of the US$3.8 billion project argued that by facilitating access to one of the largest oil fields in the country, the DAPL would boost US energy independence and allow for exports to strengthen ties to allies (not to mention adding to ETP’s revenue and earnings). Further, the supporters argued, underground transport was safer and more environmentally friendly than rail or truck transportation. North Dakota and other state economies would benefit. DAPL construction alone would create some 10,000 jobs, and more than 80,000 jobs could be traced to Bakken-related activities. There were also gains to be had by the international consortium of banks—some 17 in total—that had provided loans to finance the project.

Representatives of Standing Rock, which is home to over 8,000 members of the Dakota and Lakota Nations, countered that the DAPL violated the sovereign rights they held under the 1851 Treaty of Traverse des Sioux and 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie. Further, they cited specific concerns about sacred burial sites, health risks (e.g., water pollution, contaminated fish), and environmental degradation (oil leaks, etc.). The eastern edge of the reservation lay along Lake Oahe, the Sioux’s main source of water, and the DAPL was scheduled to go under the lake bed.

For two years, from June 2014-June 2016, the ETP held various informational meetings and filed applications for government approval (e.g., from the Iowa Utilities Board). In March 2016, the IUB approved ETP’s DAPL plan, and US Forestry & Wildlife Services issued a sovereign land construction permit, but in May, the permit was revoked in parts of Iowa. By then, the US Environmental Protection Agency, US Department of the Interior, US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and Advisory Council on Historic Preservation had gotten involved. ETP asserted that the DAPL did not cross reservation land and that there had been over 389 meetings with 55 tribes. The company began construction in June 2016. In July, the Standing Rock Sioux sued the USACE; in August, protestors began a widely publicized sit-in to block construction; and in September, United Nations experts issued statements supporting the Sioux. By the end of 2016, President Obama had asked USACE to consider alternatives and USACE announced that it would not grant an easement for Lake Oahe without an environmental impact study.

On January 24, 2017, four days after his inauguration, President Trump signed a memorandum expediting approval of DAPL construction and promising to renegotiate “some terms.” After a short assessment period, the USACE sent a notice of intent to Congress to grant the easement under Lake Oahe. Protestors were forced to vacate development land by February 22. The pipeline was completed in April, and the first oil was delivered in May 17. It is not clear how, if at all, the Sioux benefitted.

For a pro-DAPL perspective, see: [https://daplpipelinefacts.com/](https://daplpipelinefacts.com/)
The Hydro Project: A Précis

The James Bay Project in northern Québec is one of the world’s largest hydroelectric systems. Built for Hydro-Québec in stages, the project began in 1971. Phase 1 entailed construction of three power stations on La Grande River at a cost of C$13.7 billion. At the time, this region was home to 5,000 Cree and 4,000 Inuit. The project damaged their communities and flooded 11,500 km\(^2\) of wilderness land. During Phase 2, which began in 1987, Hydro-Québec added a fourth station on La Grande and proposed construction of a new hydroelectric complex on the Great Whale River. This documentary film (“Power”) covers reactions to this proposal between 1989 and 1994.

History of James Bay

James Bay, an inlet of Hudson Bay in Canada, represents the southernmost tip of the Arctic Ocean and spans the borders of the provinces of Ontario and Québec. (See Figure 1.) The shores of James Bay are widely regarded as the most habitable land in the region. The area hosts hundreds of rivers and an abundance of wildlife and has been inhabited by Indigenous people for over 8,000 years.

In 1610, this area drew the attention of English explorer Henry Hudson when his ship became icebound in James Bay and the crew sought refuge ashore. Hudson saw the rich fur and mineral potential of the land. By 1668, the first trading post in Canada had been established at the mouth of the Rupert River in James Bay. Additional posts led to formation of the Hudson’s Bay Company.

Fur trading and fur farming drove the Canadian economy for the next two centuries, but after confederation in 1867, the Government of Canada focused on agricultural and industrial development. The British Crown acquired western lands from the Hudson’s Bay Company in 1869 and a year later, transferred the lands to Canadian jurisdiction. Indigenous communities were not consulted in these transactions, protested about their mistreatment, and began intimidating new settlers in the West.

The Canadian government then began “land cessation treaty” negotiations with Indigenous communities. “Treaty 1” was concluded in 1871. It committed the Anishinabek and Swampy Cree of southern Manitoba to “cede, release, surrender, and yield up [land] to her Majesty the Queen” in exchange for tracts of “reserve” land, yearly annuities, and a government-run school on each reserve.

Over the next 50 years (to 1921), ten more numbered treaties were signed. They cover large portions of Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia, and all Territories. Treaty 9 covers the Ontario-side of James Bay and the Ontario-Québec border. No numbered treaties were signed in Québec.

This guide was prepared by Stephen E. Weiss, Associate Professor of Policy/Strategic Management and International Business, York University, Schulich School of Business, and Cody Greer (MBA ’17). It is intended to provide a basis for class discussion, not to serve as a complete factual record or assessment of the actual events.

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According to the preamble of Treaty 9, the lands surrendered by Indigenous people were open “for settlement, immigration, trade, travel, mining, lumbering and other such purposes.”¹ Most terms of the treaty were one-sided and essentially dictated, and in the years that followed, the Canadian government barely engaged Indigenous people in the development of non-reserve land.

The Plan for a Massive Hydro Project

On April 29, 1971, Québec Premier Robert Bourassa announced plans for the “project of the century”: a multi-billion-dollar hydroelectric complex. He was convinced that the province’s economic development depended on exploitation of its natural resources, and he was also concerned that demand for electricity would outpace supply. (The population of Québec in 1971 was 6 million.) Moreover, Bourassa was wary of nuclear energy. His vision was to dam and divert the rivers feeding James Bay, double the flow of the La Grande Rivière, and establish the largest power-generating site in North America.

Without completing an environmental impact study or consulting the combined 15,000 Cree and Inuit who lived in James Bay (see Figure 2), the Québec government proceeded to build a 620-km remote road for the project. This move, on top of Bourassa’s announcement, galvanized Indigenous communities in protest. They formed The Québec Association of Indians—which marked the first time First Nations banded together for such a cause—and sought to stop any further construction on the project. In November 1973, the Association won an injunction to that effect (the “Malouf Judgment”). This was a major achievement in an era when the rights of Indigenous people had yet to be defined or observed. It was short-lived, however, as the judgment elicited multiple appeals and was suspended pending review by Québec’s Court of Appeals.

Since 1971, the provincial government had negotiated with Indigenous communities informally—that is, without formally acknowledging their claims. In 1974, however, the Court of Appeals upheld the cultural rights of regional communities and required the government to undertake treaty negotiations. The Court overturned the injunction to halt James Bay construction but sparked serious discussions. To represent the impacted communities, the Cree formed the Grand Council of the Crees. Its 20 members included the Grand Chief and chiefs of each of the nine Cree communities of the James Bay Cree. The Grand Council joined forces with the Northern Québec Inuit Association, and they negotiated with government representatives for the next two years.

On November 11, 1975, the James Bay Northern Québec Agreement was signed by the Government of Canada, the Government of Québec, and representatives from each Cree community and most Inuit communities. In contrast to the language of the numbered treaties, this agreement explicitly—and contractually—defined, for the first time, the rights of Indigenous people in Canada. In exchange for

accepting hydroelectric development, they received financial compensation, greater autonomy, reserve-land, environmental protection, educational establishments, healthcare, and social services.²

James Bay I (Phase I) - La Grande Complex

Hydro-Québec, a state-owned public utility formed by the Government of Québec in 1944, manages the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity in the province. Between 1971-1984, the company built three hydroelectric power stations on La Grande Rivière at a cost of C$13.7 billion. Collectively referred to as The La Grande Complex, the three stations were labelled LG-2 (later named the Robert-Bourassa), LG-3, and LG-4. LG-2 was completed in 1982, and LG-3 and LG-4 joined it in 1984. LG-2, the largest, has the capacity to produce 7,722 MW of electric power.³ (See Figure 3.)

This project, which became known as James Bay I, or Phase I, involved construction of over 200 structures to alter the courses of 19 waterways. The Eastmain, Opinaca, and Caniapiscau rivers—all major water systems—were diverted to dammed reservoirs on La Grande Rivière. Upon completion, the LG-2 reservoir alone covered 2,835 km² (larger than Luxembourg). The main spillway is three times the height of Niagara Falls. Its main dam (Figure 4) is 4 km long. When the entire series of dams and dikes is taken into account, The La Grande Complex stretches 66 km.

Construction of the complex caused massive environmental and social damage. Approximately 11,500 km² of land was flooded, destroying habitat for wildlife and the Cree. The village of Fort George was uprooted and moved to Chisasibi. Flooding led to mercury contamination, which poisoned fish and killed 10,000 caribou. The complex rendered Eastmain River barely a stream.

James Bay II (Phase II) - The Great Whale Complex

In 1986, after returning to office from a nine-year absence, Premier Bourassa announced the beginning of Phase II of James Bay and an investment of C$7.5 billion.⁴ Work on this phase began in 1987 with the construction of LG-2-a and LG-1, which was located at the mouth of La Grande Rivière.

Phase II centered, however, on a new project called the Great Whale (Grande Baleine) Complex. It would require dams on the Great Whale, Nottaway, Broadback and Rupert Rivers and was expected to take 21 years to build at a cost of C$13 billion.⁵ Promoting it in a CBC interview in 1988, Bourassa emphasized the

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² Specific provisions for the Cree included: C$225 million in funding managed by native-owned development corporations; special hunting and fishing rights on almost 60% of all Québec land; 14,000 km² of reserve land; and environmental and social protection, including systematic, environmental evaluations of new projects.

³ For a sense of scale, consider that 1 MW can supply 600-1,200 residential homes. Precise figures are complicated.

⁴ Bourassa, who represented the Québec Liberal Party, served as Premier from 1970-76 and 1985-94.

low electricity rates for the Québécois people, the attractiveness of low-cost power to foreign investors, and the ability to dedicate almost all production of Great Whale to export markets (namely, the United States). It is also worth noting that Phase I created 18,000 jobs; Phase II would create thousands more.

Nonetheless, the Cree were still reeling from the consequences of James Bay I. Its full effect was very difficult to grasp, and many issues—environmental and social—remained unresolved. Furthermore, the Cree community of Whapmagoostui was located right at the mouth of the Great Whale River. Still, for Phase II, Hydro-Québec and government agencies took the stance that social effects on communities were unrelated to the project and should not influence its feasibility. In the late 1980s, the Cree challenged Québec’s rights, sought an injunction (again), and formed alliances with environmental activists.

**Broad Political Context: Québec Separatism**

Views on James Bay development were not sheltered from contemporary politics in the province. Since the early 1970s, a significant portion of the population had sought independence from the rest of Canada, and “separatists” recognized that economic wherewithal was important for an independent Québec. James Bay had the potential to play a major role in Québec’s economic development and independence.

In 1990, the Meech Lake Accord, which recognized Québec as a “distinct society,” failed to be fully ratified. The following year saw the formation at the federal level of a political party devoted to Québec nationalism: the Bloc Québécois. It did well in the 1993 federal election. In the 1994 provincial elections, the secessionist Parti Québécois won, and their leader, Jacques Parizeau, promised a referendum during his term. In the meantime, the Cree became quite concerned about how Québec’s future would affect them.

**Hydro-Québec in 1989**

In 1989, Hydro-Québec generated C$5.3 billion in annual revenue, employed 22,773 people, and contributed C$619 million in funds (net income) to the revenue side of Québec’s 1989-90 budget of C$31 billion. The company supplied all of the province’s power needs and exported the rest of its production. Exports from James Bay I in 1987 went to Canadian provinces and to the USA (New York, Maine, Vermont) and added C$700 million to annual revenue. (Exports to the USA had a disproportionate effect on income since Hydro charged Americans more than it charged locals.) In 1989, Premier Bourassa and New York State Governor Mario Cuomo signed a US$13 (C$17) billion contract for Hydro-Québec to supply power to the state. By then, Cree opposition to the Great Whale Project (James Bay II) had greatly intensified.

**Point of Departure for Viewing the Film (“Power: One River, Two Nations”)**

This film documents subsequent events and various aspects of the Great Whale dispute (1989-94). The Cree were led by Grand Chief Matthew Coon Come; Hydro-Québec’s CEO was Armand Couture. The two parties and their stakeholders had very different sets of interests. Could the parties negotiate with each other and reach an agreement that would satisfy these interests?

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7 Sources for figures: 1) [www.simplebooklet.com](http://www.simplebooklet.com), 2) [http://www.ottertooth.com/Native_K/jbcree.htm](http://www.ottertooth.com/Native_K/jbcree.htm), and 3 & 4) [www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca](http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca).
As shown at the end of the film, on November 21, 1994, Québec Premier Jacques Parizeau announced that the province was postponing plans to build the Great Whale Project (James Bay II). He told reporters, “I can’t speak for my grandchildren ... [but the] project is on ice for quite a while.” He cited insufficient need for the project, but he was also undoubtedly influenced by the cancellation of the supply contract to New York State and public disclosure of federal and provincial reviews citing “major inadequacies” in Hydro-Québec’s environmental impact study. (The 5,000-page study took 11 years to complete.) By this point, Hydro had spent C$256 million on project preparations.

Hydro-Québec and the Cree, 1995-2000

Notwithstanding the postponement of the Great Whale Project, Hydro-Québec continued to try to persuade the Cree of the social and economic benefits of their projects. For a new project—the Rupert River Diversion Project (a.k.a. Eastmain-1 and 1A, and Sarcelles)—the company changed tactics. Instead of meeting with the Grand Council of the Crees, Hydro-Québec approached individual Cree communities directly. In 1995, the company offered them collectively C$6 million a year and equity in the project. Two of the five communities near the diversion opposed the plan and questioned the exclusion of the Grand Council. In 2000, internal debates came to a head at a general assembly of the James Bay Cree when there was a public demonstration against the project. Hydro-Québec retaliated by calling off negotiations.

New Relationship Agreement of 2002 (Paix des Braves)

Québec Premier Bernard Landry realized that the conflict required a different approach. Taking the initiative away from Hydro-Québec, he conceived of a “nation-to-nation” negotiation and formulated a plan with Grand Chief Ted Moses to focus on developing principles by which to “implement Cree rights to the benefit of the Cree Nation.” Landry then mandated his Secretary General of the Cabinet to conduct negotiations with the Cree leadership in closed-door sessions (i.e., away from public scrutiny). Grand Chief Moses had a mandate from the Board of the Grand Council to negotiate on its behalf.

When the two sides reached an agreement in principle, it was publicly announced. The Grand Council then held public meetings with their constituents to obtain feedback on the agreement. Some concerns were raised about the negotiation format, but the agreement was generally supported, and the Grand Chief returned to the negotiating table to work out details of a final agreement. Upon its completion, a second round of consultations was held, and Cree community referenda finally approved the agreement.

9 Moses was elected in 1999. He also served from 1984-87, just prior to Matthew Coon Come’s intervening 12-year term.
The “Agreement Respecting a New Relationship (Paix des Braves) Between Le Gouvernement du Québec and The Crees of Québec” was signed on February 7, 2002. This 13-chapter document addresses forestry, hydroelectricity, mining, economic and community development, financial provisions, creation of the Cree Development Corporation, and dispute settlement. Substantively, the treaty reinforced Québec’s obligations to the Cree under the 1975 James Bay Northern Québec Agreement (JBNQA), established joint jurisdictions, and set up a collaborative process for future hydroelectric projects. It also committed Hydro-Québec to carry out “remedial measures” for its projects. Among the specific terms, Québec agreed to pay the Cree roughly C$70 million per year for 50 years (C$3.5 billion), indexed on the value of annual production of the forestry, mining and hydroelectric sectors on Cree land. The Cree dropped their C$8 billion lawsuit against Québec and consented to construction of the Eastmain-1 generating station. Government officials called the agreement a “shining model” for relationships with First Nations.

In subsequent negotiations, the Convention Boumhounan (2002) gave the go-ahead for environmental assessments of the two remaining stations in the Rupert River Diversion Project (Eastmain-1-A and Sarcelle), and Hydro-Québec promised the Cree C$866 million in construction contracts and job training.

**James Bay II Completion, 2003-13**

In 2003, Hydro-Québec began building Eastmain-1 (480 MW). The six-year project created some 8,000 jobs. In 2007, construction began on Eastmain-1-A (768 MW) and, in 2008, on Sarcelle (150 MW). Their completion in 2013, at a cost of C$5 billion, marked the completion of “James Bay II.”

The Great Whale Project was never undertaken. (It cost the Cree C$8 million to block it.\(^\text{12}\))

All told, the James Bay “Project” comprises 11 major hydroelectric generating stations in two main areas. The La Grande Complex accounts for 8 of them, including Hydro-Québec’s 4 largest stations. This complex alone represents one of the largest hydroelectric systems in the world. It covers an area the size of New York State, and the eight plants together have an installed capacity of 16,000 MW—enough to power an entire country such as Israel or Finland. The Rupert River Project plants add another 949 MW of capacity. In total, the reservoirs of the James Bay Project cover 13,341 km\(^2\) and collectively represent the largest water body ever created by humans. Hydro-Québec’s total investment through 2008 ran C$50 billion.

**Hydro-Québec and James Bay Cree Today**

Today, Hydro-Québec relies on the James Bay power stations for 50% of its total electricity output. In 2016, the company operated 62 hydroelectric generating stations, employed 19,552 people, and sold 202 TW of electricity. Annual revenue reached C$13.3 billion, with 28% of that amount derived from exports to New England (48%), New York (26%), and Ontario (14%). (See Appendix A.) Hydro-Québec provides the Québécois people with low-cost electricity and contributes significantly to the Government of Québec’s annual budget revenue ($4 billion out of C$82.4 billion in 2016)\(^\text{13}\)). The Cree in the 350,000 km\(^2\) James Bay territory (which they call “Eeyou Istchee” or “land of the people”) now number about 18,000.\(^\text{14}\) Matthew Coon Come was re-elected Grand Chief in 2009 and served until

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13 Hydro-Québec’s C$4 billion includes net income ($2.8 billion), water royalties, public utility taxes, and fees on debts. Québec’s total revenue for its 2016 budget was C$102.6 billion, but that included $20.2 billion from federal transfers.

14 In the entire Province of Québec, there are approximately 38,000 Cree. In Canada as whole, they number about 200,000, and in North America, the Cree are one of the largest First Nations.
July 2017, when he retired from public life. The Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee) continues to represent the James Bay Cree politically, but another body, the “Cree Nation Government,” headed by a board of directors, also now exists to exercise certain municipal powers. The members of the two bodies are essentially the same, so they often act in concert as the “Council/Board.”

By the completion of James Bay II in 2013, the Cree had seen measurable gains in economic and social conditions. Employment rates in the nine communities (see Appendix B) rose 7.3% from 2002-12, and social services and modern infrastructure were put in place. The transfer of JBNQA obligations allowed the Cree to pursue development opportunities and negotiate directly with private companies. In 2011, for example, the Cree Mineral Exploration Board assisted the community of Wemindji in negotiations with Goldcorp Inc. over the development of a gold mine which ultimately created 1,265 jobs.

The Cree Nation receives funds from the Province of Québec and the Government of Canada. In 2015-16, they provided roughly equal amounts (C$116 million), with $90 million of Québec’s amount attributable to the annual payment stipulated in the New Relationship Agreement. Supplemented with additional funds, the Cree Nation’s total annual budget of C$325 million was used for the Cree Nation Government, regional programs, and disbursements to each of the nine communities (half of which lie near power stations). Canada and Québec also provided other funds for Cree education, health, and social services.

Socially, the Cree do not seem to have fared as well. The negotiated agreements articulate principles concerning the preservation and restoration of Cree culture, but programs set up for that purpose have been regulated by provincial bodies, not Cree communities. Many of the regulations, which cover various activities (e.g., hunting, fishing and trapping on Traditional Territory), have been viewed by the Cree as overly restrictive. In 2012, the Government of Québec and the Cree Nation reached an agreement on governance that expands the latter’s authority and Cree ability to rely on the land. The Grand Council’s own 2015-16 Annual Report (p. 24) stated: “[Our] ... persistent and determined strategy to get the implementation of the Québec and Federal Government treaty obligations has been greatly rewarded. The success is apparent in the ongoing development and improvement of the Cree communities.”

Finally, the relationship between Hydro-Québec and the Cree has improved significantly over the years. Eastmain 1-A alone resulted in C$831 million worth of contracts to the Crees and employed 1,500 Cree workers. Hydro-Québec consulted land users from preliminary design all the way through construction. Marc Dunn, Regional Coordinator for the Environment for the Niskamoon Corporation, remarked, “It was a very complex project, and it … set new ground and new standards about how projects are done.” At the same time, financial aspects of the relationship are neither simple nor problem-free. In 2016, Cree Nation Treasurer Matthew Swallow stated, “… there continues to be a dispute with Hydro-Québec in regards [sic] to the confidentiality of the data required to determine the actual value of the economic production in the Territory. In sum, since 2002, the James Bay Cree-Hydro-Québec relationship has brought major benefits to both parties, yet it also remains very much a work-in-progress.

16 The Eléonore mine began operations in 2015. Among its employees, 21% identify as Indigenous.
17 Among the achievements with the federal government, the Cree concluded: 1) the “Agreement Concerning a New Relationship between the Government of Canada and The Crees Of Eeyou Istchee” (2008); and 2) the “Agreement on Cree Nation Governance between The Crees of Eeyou Istchee and The Government of Canada” (2017).
Appendix A. Major Installations of Hydro-Québec (December 2016)


Appendix B. Communities of the James Bay Cree (2014)

source: http://www.ottertooth.com/Native_K/jbcree.htm
Transcript/Notes for the Film “Power: One River, Two Nations” [James Bay II (Great Whale) Project]

length: 76 mins. c1996
[village called “Great Whale” in the film is actually the Cree community called Whapmagoostui located at the mouth of the Great Whale River (on James Bay/Hudson Bay)]

Note: This document describes the essential contents of the film. It is not a verbatim or complete transcript; rather, it is intended to help instructors locate key scenes and statements. Any notes added to the film’s contents below by the transcriber are separately designated by parentheses [ ].

DVD count (minutes.seconds)
[ intro words]

0.10 Northern Quebec – one of world’s last areas for hydro development
also homeland of Inuit and Cree nations
early 1970s, Hydro Quebec moved into territory to dev. one of world’s largest hydro projects – James Bay project
Phase 1 – centered on La Grande river
Phase 2 – Quebec wants to build James Bay II (beg. with Great Whale river proj.)
15,000 Cree live there and decide to oppose project

1.01 Bourassa announces in Parliament beg. of Phase 2 with $7.5 bn investment with 40,000
jobs in years to come
scenes of Cree on water ... lots of music

1.28 arrival of helicopter (Hydro execs), met by protestors
their car is blockaded
Cree leaders tell Hydro reps
Robbie Dick (Chief of Great Whale): We’ve told you time and again we don’t want
this. You’re pushing us, are you going to leave or not ...”
they do leave
1989 Cuomo and Bourrassa sign a C$17bn. energy contract

3.42 Cree protestors, introduction of Grand Chief Come

4.00 Bourassa says “to develop hydroelectricity is to conquer the north”

4.30 Coon Come: I have mandate to stop project ... all I can do to oppose it
shots of village

4.55 POWER title on screen

5.00 town meeting
Stella Leney from Hydro Quebec explains the project to the Cree
Generating station site: 285 km from mouth of river
land to be flooded (1774 km sq area) ... 7 main dams
flow of rivers: Great Whale River to be reduced by 85 and Little Whale
River by 94%

5.49 [Coon Come discusses upcoming meeting]
Cree way: elders will speak first ... women too
not one day for the elders … they speak each day (Mon-Thurs)

6.52 town meeting

drummer … drumming
panel from Hydro … [horrible posture]
Cree reps speak at mike
elder woman: “how come you want to dam our rivers? don’t you have enough energy?
… even at night, it’s like daytime” …
another: “What you are doing isn’t right. Your plans are just pieces of paper. I would like to burn them.”
Dianne Reid (Cree activist) .. “You wish to develop in the north ..you have developed here … we have anger … no more, enough is enough”

8.32 Cree exec meeting [large group …12 -15? people]
Robert Mainville (lawyer for Cree): you’re up constructors, etc …
against billions and billions of $ … govt figures they’re going to make money out of this

8.57 Dick: so we can’t go and compromise … we made that mistake with James Bay agreement … people understand that now
consultant: it’s a noble position … but Hydro Q doesn’t care, they have laws on their side … army … “they don’t even understand what you’re talking about”
fight the project on principle, but don’t be naïve about it…”you have to get the message out to the world” … use the international forums, the courts, whatever’s available to you to stop the project

10.00 1990: Voyage of the Odyak (combo of kayak and canoe)
going to the US because Americans buy the Hydro power (NY and New England)
want American media attention …
Matthew Mukash, Task Force Coordinator on radio:
“It’s the Americans who buy electricity from Hydro-Quebec. It is their money which finances the destruction of Cree territory. We must force New York and New England to cancel their contracts with Hydro-Quebec. To do this, we must capture the attention of the American media. We need to do something extraordinary.”

11.12 pictures of them building the odyak

March 7, 1990 ..

11.52 [odyak taken by dog sled across snow field, goes from Great Whale]

12.40 March 24, 1990 departure ceremony in Ottawa
goes through Lake Champlain …
to plead grievances to USG

Coon Come compares odyak to Noah’s Ark

13.50 April 3, 1990 odyak arrives in Lake Champlain, NY this journey resembles historical trips of plains Indians to US Presidents to plead their
Armand Couture, CEO of Hydro-Quebec ...

“The Great Whale Project is being held hostage. What’s really at stake is the ownership of natural resources. You have to understand that this is part of the overall Cree strategy to obtain self-government and control over the territory.”

14.50 Cree hold meeting in Woodstock, NY

Mukash: “80% of our people still live off the land: hunting, fishing and trapping. This project will destroy the habitat, when that happens, there goes our culture.”

“We are the majority in that territory, and we don’t have a say in what the govt wants to do.”

15.22 Richard Le Hir, Quebec Manufacturers’ Assoc

“Here you have a situation where 15,000 people are holding hostage the rest of the province and its economic development. How long can it last? Not very long.”

April 12, Cree arrive in Albany — go to State Legislature

met by Bill Hoyt, New York State Assemblyman on steps:

for many NYers, Canada is out of sight, out of mind

It does matter because NY buys some of that hydroelectric power. Mr. Hincy? and I are introducing legislation that says simply, unless a certifiable environmental impact study is done, NY will buy no more hydro power.

17.20 April 20, 1990 — arrive in NYC

Coon Come speaks .. “if it were on your land, there’d be an outcry” … but “On Indian lands, they say move over, Indian, ‘cause we’re going to build. … we’re saying that’s unacceptable”

Robbie Dick, Chief of Great Whale: “Save our rivers” at Earth Day

Bill Hoyt (state legislator) – I don’t know who the brains are behind this, but they have been exquisite. They’ve made corporate Hydro Quebec look like dunces, like lead-footed dunces.”

18.21 Quebec National Assembly

Lise Bacon, Quebec Min of Energy – “The Cree … success maybe all over the world, but are they Quebecers or not? They live in our territory. They work with us. I hope they’re still Quebecers, and they’re penalizing Quebecers for that. And that’s what I cannot accept, and that’s what I will never accept. [Reporter: They don’t think they’re Quebecers.] Well, I hope they still live in Quebec. Because their territory that they claim is theirs is ours; we haven’t given it up—yet. … I blame them for what they’ve been doing, for discrediting Quebec all over the world. Do you think we can accept that? I don’t think so.”

19.03 1991 – Canadian Airlines plane arrives …

Bobby Kennedy arrives with environmentalists in the North … Mukash greets him they’re going to take him out on the river …
Kennedy goes rafting with Cree

Robbie Niquanaccappo, Deputy Chief of Great Whale
We’ve lived here 5000 yrs
the land – the most central thing in our lives – is to be destroyed. We’ll be alive physically but as a people we’ll be dead ... b/c our culture, values all came from the land ... land as something to be cared for, shared with other people, cherished, and passed on to our children

La Grande project (Phase 1 of James Bay project)
go back to 1975
Niquanaccappo: won’t do this time what they did last time ... didn’t warn us they did this without us ... by the time we found out about it, we’d already lost asked us to put names on a piece of paper that gave us rights ...
agreement (agt) signed with Bourassa in 1975 ... He announced: “The Cree and Inuit have given up their rights and claims to all lands in Quebec except certain designated lands around their communities. This agreement includes payment of $225 mn in compensation to the Native people over the next 20 yrs.”

Niquanaccappo: “La Grande to the south of us has been totally destroyed ... We hear from our brothers in Chisasibi ... deaths, flooded graves.... Now this project, your government asking you to be a party to destroying what you experienced out there. And I ask you, just think about it. ... Ask you to listen, and let your conscience be your guide.”

Kennedy at campfire in tent

“1992: Walking on Cement”
Coon Come and Mukash arrive in NYC ...
talking about changes in the North ... roads, forestry trucks, natural resources .. no revenue-sharing
Coon Come: I felt anger, eating me up ... mega-projects, doesn’t stop

at Natural Resources Defense Council with Robert Kennedy
drafting complaint ...
some differences over how best to draft it
NRDC benefitting from this effort in part by getting new members

Jacques Guevremont, Hydro-Quebec’s US rep: “You have to be logical. The Native people in Quebec are much better treated than Native people in the US. Robert Kennedy should look after America’s Indians rather than worrying about ours.”

Kennedy with Coon Come at Massachusetts State Legislature
quick meet & greet (connections: Kennedy’s brother introduces him to a legislator)

Kennedy with William Bulger, Mass Senate President
Kennedy: Cree aren’t saying no project; they want an environmental review
Quebec hasn’t given them that, and aren’t likely to
H-Q has even offered $ ... as much as 1 bn, Cree have said, no; review first
Coon Come: We don’t have an avenue in Canada for this
Bulger says I understand what you’re saying, you’re not getting treated up there as you desire

29.56 Bill Hoyt speaks in NY State Legislature in support of a bill re: not buying power from H-Q (New York Power Authority is buyer) says buying it would be economic, social and environmental disaster
Tony Genovese speaks agst the bill
Hoyt talks about pressure Genovese is getting to support Cree; wants pressure off

31.18 Oct. 21, 1991 – ad in NYT “Catastrophe at James Bay” discussed on TV cost $40,000 – many supporting organizations beside National Resources Defense Council – Greenpeace, Sierra Club, etc.

31.49 Pariseau, leader of Parti Québécois, reacts in Quebec Parliament against ad in one of the most respected newspapers in the world ... when will cabinet, H-Q, and/or gov’t, together or separately, to set record straight
Pelletier (journalist) – H-Q is not just any company; it’s Quebec’s instrument of emancipation ... it’s a sacred cow

32.49 demonstrations in NYC
33.05 press conference with Richard Douin, Chm of H-Q ... are you losing PR battle?
up to this pt., we didn’t have presence in other markets we sell our energy at the border; the client picks it up from there but now, it’s our duty to be there

33.20 Cree exec committee
Billy Diamond, Chief of Waskaganish:
“A lot of people are asking questions. What are the Cree doing in New York? Why are we concentrating in overseas. I really believe that we should start building bridges over to the Québécois, get a whole debate going on the Quebec energy policy. You gotta light the fire somewhere, and the fire that you light is in the Québécois society…”

Coon Come – “I don’t know what would happen should Quebec secede from Canada. How Quebec would treat its first nations here in Quebec. So in order to protect ourselves, we’ve also got to be out there in the international community. … We will need that support.”

34.26 [Cree church service]
Dianne Reid, Cree activist:
“We’re up against a lot. We know that as a small nation. What we need to do beyond the work that’s been done by our political representatives is to bring the strength of the nation, and that’s the grassroots voice.”
We know there are political groups out there that are not interested in listening to grassroots ... our political leaders have been caught in a bind of dealing with a
non-native political system and have operated in a way that... typically operate where they tend to forget the community voice.”

35.32 [Coon Come in New York City]
35.58 Coon Come: as long as I know where my heart is, where my people are...
I’m away from home a lot
[prayer in family tent] ... It takes its toll

36.34 Coon Come canoeing on the lake
“There’s a lot of tug and pull conflict in terms of wanting to hunt, fish and trap. But you can’t. You need someone out there. And I feel that I can contribute. But there definitely is a drawback ‘cause you’re walking on cement.”

37.21 [goose-hunting]

37.35 “[I learned from my grandfather.] When you go after an animal, you have to know its every move. You have to think like him. I have to know how H-Q works, how they think, and I have to sometimes be in the offensive, sometimes in the defensive, and to make sure that my mind’s focused.” [writing notes in hotel rm]

38.05 [speech at New York Bar Association]
Coon Come: “When we signed the James Bay agreement, we agreed to 1 project and 1 project only, and we have paid the price. We have paid it dearly. And yet H-Q says we have received compensation. That is the problem with your society. You think you can solve problems by asking how much. We can pay you, we can compensate you. But no amount of money can replace the wealth of the land.”

38.46 Bourassa: “Perhaps in the short term, they have an effect on public opinion. They’ve been lucky because of the drop in energy demand. But demand will increase, because society can’t survive with zero growth (with all the needs that society has). When demand increases again, the Americans will have to choose. What are the choices? They recently closed Shoreham, a nuclear station. Will they reopen it?”

39.16 photo of Rockefeller Center
Telecast of NY state legislature debate re: bill on energy purchases
Environment? Indian nation? No, it’s all about money.
[Coon Come, Mukash, Kennedy watching in hotel room]
Speakers: Hoyt (“Ladies and Gentlemen, I urge a “yes” vote.”), etc.

39.56 drums at Cree gathering

40.10 Cuomo (New York Power Authority) cancels H-Q contract
b/c NY state can meet its energy needs through conservation
Coon Come and Kennedy hug

40.30 Great Whale
community dance .. victory party
Ashok Gupta, Natural Resources Defence Council
“It’s important victory ... but it’s not the whole thing.”
Cree Task Force Meeting
Robert Mainville (beard), lawyer for the Cree
“We’ve never been closer to canceling the project. The question is we have to go for the kill. … Now is there some way to create a face-saving situation for Bourassa to either delay Great Whale …”

HQ chairman at press conference ...
discusses negotiations
not a territorial motivation, only economic on HQ's part

Bourassa: “It’s true we lost the contract last Friday, a contract that was very important. It’s a setback, but not a defeat.”

James O’Reilly, lawyer for the Cree
“It’s a serious mistake for say, environmental groups or people in the United States to think that they have driven H-Q to their knees.”

H-Q Chm Douin at press conference
“We still believe Great Whale is the best option.” “There are no political considerations in choosing Great Whale over other projects.”
Reporter: It’s not just will to occupy the territory?
Couture: “No, it’s not territorial.”


H-Q CEO Couture interview:
“Despite the public discord between the Cree and H-Q, we have signed numerous agts regarding James Bay I with the Cree to modify existing components or add new ones to the James Bay I project. Public confrontation is not our negotiating style. We expect to sign additional agreements with the Cree, related to our projects.”

Coon Come: says H-Q has “colonialistic attitude of divide and conquer. If you can get one particular group on your side, and favor them, and work very well with them to try to demonstrate they are cooperating with you. … They can use that with other bands, use it against them [other Cree bands]. If the bands, in turn, they don’t recognize it, can be used as hostage by H-Q.”

James Bay I is still going on. H-Q still completing last dams for it
new project will cause flooding on La Grande River south of Great Whale

HQ pressures Cree to sign an agt accepting compensation for this flooding
this is separate from the Great Whale project, but seen as a tactic to weaken Cree opposition to the Great Whale project

Great Whale
Mukash on radio: H-Q wants to modify the La Grande project
They will flood more land used by people of Chisasibi
H-Q offers $50 mn as compensation for the flooding
“H-Q has made it clear that this is a take-it-or-leave-it offer.”

46.24 Meeting at Great Whale

Mukash – newly elected Chief of Great Whale
“If we do not clearly show our opposition to this agt, our supporters will think that we only care about money and not about the land and graves that will be flooded. What is your mandate for us on this issue?”

audience says “Many of us don’t understand the agt, so somebody needs to help us. In my opinion, we can’t even trust our own lawyers. To really deal with this, we need to have our own people involved. I want you, our leaders, to be part of this.”

47.33 Chisasabi and other communities affected by James Bay I don’t see the compensation agt the same way as the other Cree
Billy Diamond, Chief of Waskaganish “We don’t have time to go fight and help Great Whale. We have alcohol and drug problems in the community, traditional family breakdown, family violence. We need a justice program, education, health. For our people, Great Whale is stumbling block to get programs, to get services, and to get certain things from the Government of Quebec.”

48.08 H-Q headquarters
Couture and Coon Come
Coon Come: “As a leader, there are certain things I have to recognize. There is a time for everything. There’s a time to fight, there’s a time to negotiate, and there’s a time to make hard decisions, and as Grand Chief, I have to make those decisions that I feel that are in the best interests of my people.”

[Image of Cree and H-Q on two sides of negotiating table, behind glass]

48.50 Reid: “We can no longer afford to negotiate land in exchange for money. It might mean challenging some of our political leadership to remind them that they were elected by the grassroots people … And if the people choose to oppose any further development in the north and no negotiated agreements, well these political leaders have to listen to that voice. And they have no right to go and make independent deals with H-Q or the Quebec government or anyone.”

49.30 Great Whale ...
Telephone Meeting: Great Whale Cree – Coon Come (in Montreal)
Mukash: “There was a lot of heated discussion at the bands meeting in regards to the agt. … don’t want to start a war here, but … make sure our concerns are taken into account, that the Cree Nation as a whole is aware of the implications of signing this agreement. What concerns us most is the fact that there have been no consultations with the bands”

[He’s talking by phone to Coon Come and O’Reilly (lawyer) who are in Montreal at lawyers’ offices.]

Mukash: “We have a problem with respect to statements that have been made by some
some leaders at Council/Board meetings to the effect that we may have lost Great Whale.”

50.33 O’Reilly: “I think if this agreement is signed, your legal position on Great Whale River is reinforced. It is not diminished.”

Mukash: “I disagree because the previous agts have not done that. We expect that there’ll at least be a delay in the signature of agreement until we have fully understood what it means.”

51.10 O’Reilly: “The Hydro will have the option of controlling the situation as to whether it wants to sign or doesn’t sign at any time. So you put yourselves when you’re in your most vulnerable position entirely into legal hands of Hydro.”

51.37 Coon Come [to himself, not spoken to others in meeting]: “I don’t expect all the chiefs representing their communities to be on the same wavelength, but that’s where it’s difficult as a leader. You have to make sure everyone’s views is heard. You’re always weighing all kinds of factors

51.55 Mukash (switches from English to Cree): “H-Q is playing games with us. Every time we accept more money, things go badly.”

Coon Come (in Cree): I understand what your concerns are Matthew Mukash. I thought about these issues during my Christmas holidays. Since I became Grand Chief, the most difficult time has always been when we have had to sign agts. With this agt, I want to try to help the hunters who are having a hard time making a living. I want to help people in the villages by improving their living conditions. I am telling you now that I will sign the agreement. This is what I have decided. All right?”

53.35 [no response from Mukash to Coon Come’s position ... hangup by Mukash? ...

O’Reilly doesn’t understand Cree?]

53.42 Montreal

7 people on Cree team (incl. O’Reilly) walking

54.19 signing ceremony: Douin–Coon Come

Cree consent to additional flooding for James Bay I ... for $50 mn compensation.

Opimiscow Agreement

55.05 press conference

Reporter: “Even though this agt is not part of Great Whale, are you concerned that your supporters might be perceived this agt as a sign that you’re soft, as a sign that you can be bought, that the Cree be bought off by developers?”

Coon Come: “Yes, I’m always concerned that other people, our supporters, will interpret this as us being soft. We really appreciated the support that we got. But in the end, who will be affected? It is our people that’ll be affected.”

drums ...
Reid: The land is the spirit of our people. The more the land is destroyed, the more our spirit is destroyed."

placards/posters “Bourassa’s dream is our nightmare”
Chisasibi ... drums continue

Representative Albert Herren asks Coon Come: “Why would you be so willing to modify an agreement in light of the fact that you signed the original agreement, in 1975, under duress? If H-Q came to me in 1989 and said I want to put 4 more hydro stations, I would be telling H-Q to take a hike.”

Coon Come: “The position that we are in ... we have to see how we can co-exist together ... that society is Quebec. They needed additional energy

Herren: “So why give them approval?”

Coon Come: This is a river that’s already dead. They’ve already built LG2, LG3; they’ve already built LG4.”

after 1 yr of hearings and studies, H-Q releases environmental impact study on Great Whale hydro project

HQ press conference ...
Leney: We had already been studying this project for 10 yrs, so we already had a lot of information. And we are confident that the 5,000 pages that we submitted this morning address all the concerns that are in the guidelines."

Interview: Bill Namagoose (Grand Council of the Crees)
reporter: “If they offered you $130 mn, would you take it?”
Namagoose: “No. We don’t want the project. We don’t want compensation. We just want to preserve the land. That is our mission, and that is our mandate from the people.”

Reid [pointing to document, speaking in French]: “We want a Cree translation before we go any further. That’s what they’ll say in the North. Do you think the trappers will read all this in English and French? They won’t buy it. It’s their land that you are dealing with.”

Montreal [Cree leaders and lawyers meeting (15 people?)
Mukash: “Our people have always said that we’ve been manipulated by our advisers.”
O’Reilly: “Matthew [Mukash], just because our personal differences may go back many, many years, I don’t believe that’s affected your judgement, or my judgment. You’ve had your own lawyer for a year. So, if someone is manipulating, it isn’t this cat. I find it hard to believe that after all these years, and having worked with some of the Whapmagoostui people that I and some of the other advisors were deliberately trying to deceive them, that as well I want to negotiate the Great Whale project? I’m afraid that I have to say categorically, “no” to both.”

Henry Mianscum, Chief of Mistissini: “I don’t know if you’re becoming a liability to the Crees. Maybe you are.”
O’Reilly: “No one has any lessons to give me about my personal commitment to Indian people. I’ve said a few times, and I’ll say it again today at this table, if I am the problem for the Cree Nation, I will go. But what I think you’re really criticizing is your own policies and your own decisions over the past because these have been taken collectively. And we’ve all made mistakes.”
Mianscum: “Just no more “yes” guys. And whatever O’Reilly says, we’ll say yes. No longer that.”
1.01.31 O’Reilly: “I’ve told you before, and I’ll tell you again. I’m prepared to let go as soon as you say “Let go.” Bang. That’s it. Nah, I’m serious.”

1.01.43 reindeer
[meeting of 6 Cree in a restaurant]
Reid: “Everybody wants to be the one leading, including consultants and lawyers. They fight amongst themselves to see which one’s going to be the one to be listened to, which advice is going to be listened to by the Cree leadership, and more division is being created. I’ve watched that. I’ve watched that, and I’ve seen it. But it’s time that this internal manipulation stop for the benefit of the Cree Nation, that we all sit down and work together. And if anybody wants to walk the other way and have their own agenda, get out of the circle. Enough is enough. We’re destroying each other, and we will never win this case if we continue the way we’re going. And every politician, and every Cree chief, better start listening.

1.02.43 Coon Come hands together, head bowed

1.02.50
1.03.00 “Great Whale River”
snow covered
Coon Come in odyak
[everyone works together to pull it up on shore]

1.04.10 Mukash: “It’s been 5 years since we began the fight to save our river. It hasn’t been easy … and we’ve had our differences. Yet the river still runs free. Let’s use this traditional gathering to heal our divisions, to put our differences behind us …
[Coon Come circulates on shore, shaking hands with various people]

1.04.54 Coon Come enters tent
Mukash: “... honor to have you here.”
Coon Come: “It took me 3 days to get here.”
Mukash: “White man has not controlled the weather yet.”

Public gathering
Reid: “The grandfathers say this struggle is not going to be easy, that we will fight for the very last of the lands that have not been taken away from us. Enough has been done to our people, and there’ll be no more. This is our last stand, and we will win.

1.05.55 Coon Come: “When I came across the river and saw the teepees, it reminded me of a vision my grandmother had. In her vision, she saw trees being bulldozed and the rivers being dammed and diverted. When my grandmother passed away two years ago, my mother asked me to go with her to my grandmother’s camp. When I got there, I saw her
vision had come true. The land was clearcut, the river destroyed. At that moment, I understood, only if we stand united will we survive. If we don’t, they will destroy us.”

[applause]

1.07.10 tranquil river scenes

1.07.29 “1994: Two Nations”
Mukash arrives at radio station by SUV
“It has been announced that Premier Bourassa is resigning. He has been diagnosed with cancer. Let us follow the traditional teachings and pray for the person who is ill.”

1.08.00 Bourassa
“I’m leaving with the satisfaction of having accomplished my duties. With my team, I have presided over Quebec’s destiny to the best of my abilities while respecting the liberty and dignity of my fellow citizens.”

“Six Months Later”
Parti Québécois wins provincial election

1.08.40 Parizeau, New Premier of Quebec:
“Do we want to be like other people, a people with our own country?”

1.08.57 Francine Pelletier (journalist): “The new government was elected with a very clear agenda, making Quebec an independent country. Now that means a country with the present borders that Quebec enjoys now, including the James Bay area, all the areas that the natives say are theirs. Now it’s obvious that the PQ is going to have a helluva tough time selling its project of an independent country abroad if the native groups like the Cree say “We want no part of that. We want to keep our land for ourselves.” Obviously, the Cree have become the No. 1 thorn in the side of the PQ and they also, by the same measure, are gaining tremendous bargaining power in terms of hydro development projects in the north.”

1.09.40 Coon Come speech (Center for Strategic International Studies)
“There will be no annexation of ourselves or our territory in an independent Quebec without our consent. ... we may decide to stay in Canada.”

1.10.03 Washington DC
press conference with Coon Come:
reporter: “Do you really think the Quebec government would use force against you?
Coon Come: “If we were to disobey their laws and not recognize an independent Quebec, will they send in their army?”

1.10.45 The Gazette: “Quebec Shelves Great Whale” [November, 1994]
Press conference
Parizeau: “Great Whale is not a priority for the present Quebec government. We don’t need Great Whale.”
Reporter: “So it Great Whale abandoned?”
Parizeau: “Abandoned may be too strong a term. It is on ice for a good while.”
1.11.15 Great Whale
   Party ... Coon Come and Mukash cut cake, embrace
   Group applause
   Reid: “This fight was not just about hydroelectric development. This was about bringing
   back the pride of a nation, bringing back the unity of a nation, and the strength of a
   nation.”

1.12.30 “1995 – The People Speak”
   Quebec holds referendum on separating from Canada (Oct. 30, 1995)
   Cree communities hold their own referendum ..

   Coon Come: “My people have made their choice. We, on our territory, will not be
   forcibly included in an independent Quebec.”

   Montreal: Referendum Night
   Parizeau: “We lost by the smallest of margins, a few 10s of 1000s of votes. So what will
   we do? Roll up our sleeves and start over.”

1.13.28 Cree face uncertain future
   Cree drums, scenes of river life ...
   Coon Come: “It’s been a long 5 years. The land is preserved. People can still go out
   there. People can enjoy it. People can find peace out there. People can have some kind
   of hope. If you’re bold enough and true to yourself, you can make a difference.”

1.14.20 sunset
   End of Film

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